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The Economic Sociology of Labour Law 
RUTH DUKES* 
 
Drawing on the work of Max Weber, this paper considers the utility of an approach to 
the study of labour law, which it calls the economic sociology of labour law (ESLL). It 
identifies the contract for work as the key legal institution in the field, and the primary 
focus of scholarly analysis. Characterising the act of contracting for work as an 
example of what Weber called economic social action oriented to the legal order, it 
proposes that Weber’s notion of the labour constitution be used to map the context 
within which contracting for work takes place. And it argues that, in comparison to 
traditional socio-legal approaches, ESLL has the significant advantage of allowing 
for account to be taken of the individual and commercial, as well as the social and 
legal, elements of contracting for work. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the course of the past decade or so, burgeoning interest in economic sociology as a field 
of scholarly endeavour has been accompanied by calls for the development of an economic 
sociology of law – or, as we might otherwise call it, a sociology of law and economics.1 The 
ambition of those making the calls is, in essence, to apply sociological approaches, concepts 
and methods to the two fields – economics and law – and to instances of their interaction. 
According to Sabine Frerichs’ useful formulation, the economic sociology of law is thus best 
understood as:   
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an academic venture located in the middle of the social sciences… an integrative 
effort in reconnecting law, economy, and society, both as spheres of reality and as 
fields of scholarly interest… to assert a genuinely sociological point of view which 
focuses on the relations between these spheres.2  
 
The aim of this article is to consider the utility of an economic sociology of law, or ESL, to 
the study of labour law – the field of law which regulates relations between workers and 
employers and their respective representatives (trade unions, works councils, employers’ 
associations). In recent years, there has been talk of a crisis in labour law, as concepts and 
paradigms developed during the Fordist era have become increasingly ill-suited to capturing 
the realities of post-Fordist working relations. Neo-classical economic thinking about 
working relationships and labour law has assumed the status of orthodoxy, shaping the policy 
and legislation of governments of both the centre right and centre left, and even, over time, 
workers’ own perceptions of the world of work. As governments have sought to weaken 
existing protections and to lower labour standards in the name of flexibility and job-creation, 
workers have come to self-identify as entrepreneurs of themselves, entering the labour market 
(rather than finding a job), and making themselves marketable.3 Each of these developments 
has posed significant challenges to traditional approaches to the study of labour law, 
occasioning much soul-searching on the part of scholars in the field.4  
 
This article is positioned as a contribution to debates regarding the crisis in labour law, and, 
especially, to an ever-thickening strand of those debates which looks to methodological 
innovation as offering a possible way forward.5 Scholarship in the field of labour law has a 
strong socio-legal tradition – in large part, because normative arguments establishing the 
need for special rules to regulate working relationships have tended to rest on illustrations of 
the fundamental differences between contracts of employment and other types of contract. 
What is sold in a contract of employment – labour power – is inherently human, and from 
recognition of this essential fact flows concern with the worker’s welfare and dignity: the 
                                                          
2 S. Frerichs, ‘Studying Law, Economy, and Society: A Short History of Socio-Legal Thinking’ (2012) Helsinki 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19, at 6. 
3 S. Garrett and A. Hochschild, ‘The Personalized Market and the Marketized Self’ in A Hochschild, So How’s 
the Family? And Other Essays (2013) 
4 See eg G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds), The Idea of Labour Law (2011) 
5 See eg A. Ludlow and A. Blackham (eds), New Frontiers in Empirical Labour Law Research (2015); G. 
Davidov (ed), Labour Law Research Methodologies (2017) 33(1) International J. of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations Special Issue; R. Dukes (ed), Labour Laws and Labour Markets: New Methodologies 
(2018) Social & Legal Studies Special Issue  
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injunction not to treat her as a commodity like any other, but somehow to shelter her from 
exposure to raw market forces.6 A current example of the enduring force of such arguments, 
and of the consequent necessity to understand the nature of working relationships from a 
sociological perspective, has arisen in the context of litigation over the legal classification of 
workers in the so-called gig economy. The question for the courts, as they themselves have 
formulated it, is this: are Uber drivers or Deliveroo couriers self-employed, as their written 
contracts suggest, or are they in reality employed by the platforms in question, and as such 
entitled to legally prescribed minimum wages and other employment rights?7 
 
In addressing the question of how we best approach the study of labour law today, I begin 
from the observation that, as the coverage of trade union membership and collective 
bargaining has contracted, and employment rights have been weakened, the contract has 
asserted (or is asserting) itself as the primary legal institution in the field of working relations. 
Consequently, it has become necessary to identify or develop an approach that allows us to 
apprehend the process of contracting for work as a form of private ordering; but as one that is 
shaped directly and indirectly – likely to a very significant degree – by the complex of 
applicable legal rules and institutions, and by other aspects of the social and economic 
context within which it proceeds.8 The act of contracting for work should be understood to 
have at its core a (market) exchange of labour power for wages, or some other form of 
payment, and to be, at the same time, a self-consciously legal act with important social 
dimensions. It follows that an approach is required which allows us to take account of each of 
these aspects of contracting behaviour – the economic, the legal and the social – and of the 
different dimensions of the relevant context. 
 
It is with this challenge in mind that I turn, in the third part of the article, to the work of Max 
Weber, paying particular attention to his analysis of competing rationalities or work ethics 
under feudalism and capitalism, and to his conception of economic social action and the 
orientation of (economic social) actors to the law as potentially helpful in understanding the 
act of contracting for work. I also consider his notion of the labour constitution – essentially 
                                                          
6 K. Marx, ‘Wage Labour and Capital’ (1849) April 5-8 and 11, Neue Rheinische Zeitung, reproduced in 
translation at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/wage-labour/index.htm;  International Labour 
Organisation, Declaration of Philadelphia 1944 
7 See eg Uber BV v Aslam [2018] ICR 453; Addison Lee v Lange and Ors UKEAT/0037/18; Autoclenz v 
Belcher [2011] ICR 1157 
8 M. Freedland, ‘General Introduction’ in M. Freedland (ed), The Contract of Employment (2016) 
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the social, economic and legal organization of labour in any given place, at any given point in 
time – as providing an analytical construct that might allow us to ‘map’ the context, or 
contexts, within which contracting for work occurs, while at the same time bridging the gap 
between different levels of analysis: micro, meso and macro. In the final part, I sketch the 
contours of an ESL that builds upon these elements of Weber’s work. I then compare this 
ESL with the long-standing tradition of critical socio-legal approaches in the field and find 
them to share several strengths, but to differ, above all, in terms of the focus and scope of the 
analysis that they encourage. ESL has the significant advantage, I suggest, of allowing for 
proper account to be taken of those individual and commercial elements of the process of 
contracting for work that had previously been treated by critical scholars as (largely) 
suppressed by collective bargaining and labour legislation, without encouraging the adoption 
of overly reductive conceptions akin to the idealized market transaction of economic theory. 
 
 
ESL AND LABOUR LAW 
 
1. What is ESL? 
 
The term ‘economic sociology of law’ is a somewhat clumsy composite of ‘economic 
sociology’ and ‘sociology of law’ – Wirtschaftssoziologie and Rechtssoziologie – intended to 
imply, essentially, a sociology of law and economics, or a study of the intersection of the 
three disciplines. In calling for the development of such an approach today, social scientists – 
including, prominently, Frerichs and Richard Swedberg – have drawn upon the work of 
classical and early twentieth century scholars, especially Weber, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx 
and Karl Polanyi.9 There, one finds a sustained attempt to understand the foundations of the 
relationship between economy and society; and, in the case of Weber and Durkheim, also 
sustained consideration of the interaction of law and the economy.10 
 
                                                          
9 Swedberg (1998) op. cit., n. 1, pp. 3-6; Swedberg (2003) op. cit., n. 1; M. Coutu and T. Kirat, ‘John R. 
Commons and Max Weber: The Foundations of an Economic Sociology of Law’ (2011) 38(4) J. of Law and 
Society op. cit., n. 469; M. Coutu, ‘Max Weber on the Labour Contract: Between Realism and Formal Legal 
Thought’ (2009) 36(4) J. of Law and Society 558; F. Block, ‘Relational Work and the Law: Recapturing the 
Legal Realist Critique of Market Fundamentalism’ (2013) 40(1) J. of Law and Society 27 
10 J. Beckert and W. Streeck, ‘Economic Sociology and Political Economy: A Programmatic Perspective’ (2008) 
MPlfG Working Paper 08/4 at 12 
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Drawing very closely on Weber, Swedberg has defined ESL rather precisely as the empirical 
study of the role that law and regulations play in the economic sphere – using modes of 
analysis that highlight not only social relations, social structures and so on, but also 
individual interests.11 As such, Swedberg writes, ESL allows for the following kinds of 
question to be addressed: how do economic forces influence legal phenomena, how does law 
affect the economy, how does the ‘spirit of commerce’ come to pervade parts of the law that 
do not have directly to do with economic activity?12 The case for developing such an 
approach, for Swedberg, lies with the manifest deficiencies of both law and economics (à la 
Posner et al), and the sociology of law, when it comes to investigations of this type.13 Law 
and economics literature uses microeconomic models and abstract hypothetical examples to 
make normative arguments regarding the kinds of law best suited to achieving economic ends 
– efficiency, growth etc – without reference to empirical data. Scholars working in the 
sociology of law rarely turn their attentions to economic topics and, where they do, tend to 
focus on social structure, relations and roles, overlooking the importance of actors’ 
interests.14   
 
In an important contribution from 2014, Kerry Rittich characterises ESL more decidedly as a 
desired response to the ‘deep interpenetration’ of the social and the economic – the 
colonization of the former by the latter – that has been a central feature of the neoliberal 
era.15 As economies have been increasingly liberalized, markets have expanded rapidly into 
spheres of social life that were previously governed by alternative (non-economic) values and 
action orientations. Formerly nationalized industries have been privatized, the provision of 
‘public’ services has been contracted out to the private sector, and other social realms have 
come under growing pressure to subject themselves to the functional imperatives of a market 
economy: social programmes and charitable works have been subjected to processes of 
economic calculation and rationality; social objectives are increasingly realised through 
market processes.16 As a result, the well-established practice, in both economics and 
sociology, of treating the economy as a social domain differentiated from the rest of society, 
                                                          
11 Swedberg, op. cit. (2003), n. 1, p. 2 
12 id. 
13 id., pp. 1-2 
14 id. 
15 K. Rittich, ‘Making natural markets: flexibility as labour market truth’ 65(3) Northern Ireland Legal Q. 323. 
See also Beckert and Streeck, op. cit., n. 10 above; W. Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in 
the German Political Economy (2009); W. Streeck, ‘How to Study Contemporary Capitalism?’ (2012) 53(1) 
European J. of Sociology 1 
16 Beckert and Streeck op. cit., n. 10, pp. 10-11; Rittich op. cit., n. 15, p. 327 
6 
 
and subject to its own rules, has been rendered anachronistic.17 If the dividing line between 
the economy and society has broken down in practice then it requires, too, to be broken down 
in theory. An approach or set of approaches is needed that will allow researchers to explore 
the social logic and the social nature of the economy – of economic institutions and economic 
action – and to revisit the question of the essential relationship between economy and 
society.18 
 
In the course of attempts to make sense of such developments, law and legal change figure 
primarily, for Rittich, as a means of observing the shifting structures and dynamics of both 
markets and social relations ‘from the inside out’.19  
‘Even where reforms do not succeed at transforming social and economic relations as 
intended, reform logics and agendas provide priceless clues as to how workers, 
societies and markets are imagined and valuable insights into the pressures that may 
be brought to bear on them’.20 
Laws are not only indicative of social and economic practices, however, as Rittich notes: they 
are constitutive of such.21 One way to understand law’s constitutive role is through 
recognizing that ‘knowledgeability’ of social and economic action is always invested with 
legal notions and concepts, even if these are apprehended by the actors themselves in the 
guise of practices, routines, or shared understandings that are only dimly reminiscent of the 
legal rule from which they originally stem.22 To this we might add that if our aim is to 
analyse not only the ‘shifting structures and dynamics’ of markets and social relations but 
also legal change itself, then we ought to bear in mind that law and legal concepts are 
themselves products of knowledge acquisition as well as of political contestation. This would 
suggest the need for a careful account of the likely conflictual process of the selection and 
introduction of legal concepts and of the methods of their stabilization.23  
 
                                                          
17 Beckert and Streeck op. cit., n. 10, pp. 10-11.  
18 id. 
19 Rittich op. cit., n. 15, p. 323. 
20 id., p. 324. 
21 id., pp. 327-9; M. Weber ‘‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy’ in M. Weber, The Methodology 
of the Social Sciences (1949) at 64-5, cited Swedberg (2003) op. cit., n. 1, p. 5. 
22 R. Knegt, ‘Labour Constitutions and Market Logics: A Socio-Historical Approach’ (2018) 27(4) Social & 
Legal Studies 512; M. Weber, Economy and Society (1978) 312. 
23 Knegt id.; K. Klare, ‘Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law’ in D. Kairys (ed), The Politics of Law: a 
Progressive Critique (1982, 3rd edn.). 
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It has sometimes been argued that economic sociology ought to be combined with or 
supplemented by political economy.24 Not only would this ensure consideration of the 
capacities and possibilities of politics and policy to influence economic action and outcomes, 
it would also focus our minds squarely on the specifically capitalist nature of the economies 
under investigation.25 With these points in mind, Jens Beckert and Wolfgang Streeck 
advocated the elaboration of a ‘new economic sociology’ and, at the same time, a ‘specific 
sort of historical-institutionalist political economy’.26 While the former would allow for 
consideration of how economic social relations are shaped at the micro-level by social 
macrostructures not reducible to an economic logic, the latter would analyse from a macro 
perspective the collective interests and collective actions shaping the operation of the 
economy in concrete historical conditions.27  
 
In the economic sociology of law, the focus on law’s constitutive role in respect of social and 
economic practices might be taken to raise, already, the question of the capacity of politics 
and policy to influence the economy.28 Provided that legal rules and institutions are 
understood to be the product of political conflicts and agreements regarding their design and 
their interpretation – thereby avoiding the functionalist trap of assuming laws to result from 
some kind of self-propelling tendency towards efficiency maximization – then there may be 
little to separate ESL from what we might otherwise call political economy. In either case, 
the concern, at the macro level, would be to understand both the role of the state and (state-) 
law in shaping the economy and society, and the power relations that configure the capacity 
of different individuals and groups to do the same – either directly, or indirectly through 
wielding an influence on the state. In addition to Marx and Weber, reference might be had 
here to Joseph Schumpeter; to his conception of capitalism as involving continuous 
innovation – ‘creative destruction’ – on the part of capital seeking new ways to extract value 
from socially produced wealth.29 Or we might turn, with Frerichs and others, to Karl Polanyi, 
                                                          
24 Eg Frerichs op. cit., n. 1, p. 6. 
25 E. Tucker, ‘Uber and the Making and Unmaking of Taxi Capitalisms’ in D. McKee, F. Makela and T. Scassa 
(eds.), Law and the “Sharing Economy": Regulating Online Market Platforms (2019). 
26 Beckert and Streeck op. cit., n. 10, p. 13. 
27 id., p. 14. 
28 Frerichs op. cit., n. 1. 
29 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942); W. Streeck, ‘Driving Forces: History as 
Capitalist Development’, presented at the conference: The Dynamics of Capitalism: Inquiries on Marx on the 
Occasion of his 200th Birthday, May 2018. 
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and to his analysis of the ‘double movement’ of market expansion and social protection as 
explanatory of institutional change over time.30 
 
 
2. Why might ESL be useful to the study of labour law? 
 
Labour law was first recognised as a discrete field, or legal discipline, around a century ago.   
Then, as in the decades to come, the case for the necessity or desirability of a body of ‘labour 
law’ that was distinct from other fields was typically understood to rest upon a demonstration 
of the inequities that would follow the straightforward application of private law rules to 
employment relations.31 At a time when others were arguing for the superiority of a very 
narrowly conceived ‘blackletter’ law as science, early scholars of labour law employed a 
socio-legal, or ‘critical socio-legal’ method precisely so as to emphasise the extra-legal facts 
of the humanity of labour, the subordination of the worker to the employer, and of labour to 
capital.32 With reference thereto, they argued for the application of concepts drawn from the 
public sphere – democracy, constitution – to the organisation of work and production, 
deliberately eliding the normative and descriptive aspects of their analysis so as to make the 
case either for the requisite interpretation of prevailing norms or for law reform.33 It was with 
both descriptive and normative intent that the German-Jewish scholar Hugo Sinzheimer 
defined labour law, in contradistinction to private law, as social law: as the body of law 
which recognised the social existence of the worker, as he put it, elevating him from the 
status of legal person (which he enjoyed in private law) to human being.34 By recognising 
and guaranteeing the role of labour in the regulation, or ordering, of the economy, Sinzheimer 
argued, labour law sought at once to emancipate the worker from his relation of 
subordination to the employer, and to ensure that the economy would function in furtherance 
of the common interest, as identified by the representatives of capital and labour.35 Having 
                                                          
30 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation ([1944] 2001); Frerichs op. cit., n. 1. See also Block op. cit., n. 9, 
Streeck (2009) op. cit., n. 15. 
31 A. Bogg, A.C.L. Davies, C. Costello, J. Prassl (eds.), The Autonomy of Labour Law (2015). 
32 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘Hugo Sinzheimer’ in R. Lewis and J. Clark (eds), Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar 
Republic (1981) 98; L. Nogler, ‘In Memory of Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945): Remarks on the Methodenstreit 
in Labour Law’ (1996) 2 Cardozo Law Bulletin. 
33 R. Dukes, The Labour Constitution: the Enduring Idea of Labour Law (2014) ch. 8. 
34 H Sinzheimer, ‘Demokratisierung des Arbeitsverhältnisses’ in H. Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht und 
Rechtssoziologie: gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden ([1928] 1976), 124. 
35 H. Sinzheimer, ‘Eine Theorie des Sozialen Rechts’ (1936) XVI Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 3, 
reproduced in Sinzheimer (1976) op. cit., n. 34. 
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defined labour law, in this way, as social law – categorically different to the private or 
‘economic’ law that it was intended largely to supplant – Sinzheimer and his contemporaries 
then proceeded to analyse it primarily in isolation from private law, corporate law, and 
associated fields. In the decades of political consensus that followed the end of the Second 
World War, labour law was defined again in contradistinction to private law, but now, 
commonly, as the body of law which addressed the imbalance of power in the employment 
relation.36 Arguments regarding the necessary autonomy of labour law from other legal 
disciplines were marshalled in support of particular interpretations of legal norms, and of the 
creation of specialised labour courts and tribunals, chaired by judges with specialist training, 
who understood the full social reality of contracting for human labour.37  
 
During the 1980s and 90s, dissatisfaction with this established approach to the study of 
labour law was voiced from several quarters. At a time when labour legislation and public 
policy were more likely to be inspired by Friedman and Hayek than by Keynes, modes of 
scholarship that were focused still primarily on trade unions and the principle of free 
collective bargaining were criticised as offering an increasingly misleading description of the 
law then in force.38 The standard normative-and-descriptive statement of labour law – labour 
law is the body of law which addresses the imbalance of power in the employment relation – 
was objected to meanwhile for its tendency to encourage certain lines of enquiry and to 
obscure others. In characterizing labour law, essentially, as a force for good, and in treating 
‘workers’ as an homogenous group or social class, for example, it was argued that the 
‘imbalance of bargaining power’ framing tended to discourage consideration of the 
possibility that some workers or groups of workers might benefit from particular laws, while 
others (women, ethnic minorities) were significantly disadvantaged.39 In advancing the 
notion that labour law should function to supplant private law rules, it was elsewhere 
suggested, the standard framing promoted, or did little to challenge, an understanding of 
private law as a pre-existing, ‘natural’ order, to which labour law created limited – 
‘unnatural’ – exceptions.40 Scant attention had been paid, as a consequence, to such 
foundational matters as the ownership of corporations, the ownership of the product, and, 
                                                          
36 The classic text is P. Davies and M. Freedland (eds), Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (1983, 3rd ed) 18. 
37 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law: From Here to Autonomy’ (1987) 16 Industrial Law J. 1. 
38 Davies and Freedland, ‘Editors’ Introduction’ in Davie s and Freedland op. cit., n. 36. 
39 J. Conaghan, ‘The Invisibility of Women in Labor-Law – Gender-Neutrality in Model-Building’ (1986) 14 
International J. of the Sociology of Law 377. 
40 Klare op. cit., n. 23. 
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more generally, the significant limitations of the transformative potential of a progressive or 
social labour law within an otherwise unreconstructed capitalist economy and legal system.41 
 
A first and ultimately influential response to the growing dissatisfaction with the old ways of 
studying labour law was to reframe the field of study so as to place the labour market at its 
centre. An approach that was more closely aligned to governmental priorities in the field 
would strengthen scholars’ claim, it was suggested, to provide an accurate description and 
useful analysis of the law.42 A labour market framing would allow for microlevel analysis of 
the individual employment relation to be supplemented with macrolevel analysis.43 It would 
widen the focus of scholarly investigations beyond the traditionally defined boundaries of 
‘labour law proper’, begging questions regarding the constitution, governance, and possible 
segmentation of markets by law; the control or manipulation by government of labour supply 
through immigration controls and social welfare law; and the inclusion and exclusion of 
different workers or groups of workers from access to employment, for example through the 
provision of low-cost childcare and ‘family-friendly’ rights to paid ‘care’ leave and flexible 
working.44 A new normative ‘rationalization’ of the field could be found with the potential of 
labour laws and social rights to improve the functioning of labour markets so as to achieve a 
range of goals including, prominently, the maximization of social inclusion, efficiency, and 
growth.45  
 
The move to refocus the study of labour law on labour markets was a partially fruitful one, 
which, in some of its most promising and sophisticated formulations, involved the adoption 
of political economy framings,46 and even something like a sociology of law and economics, 
though the terminology of ESL was not used.47 In some cases, however, the concern with 
markets was taken to presuppose the adoption of economic methods and modes of analysis, 
and the applications of these to labour law.48 Abstract, ahistorical models typical of law and 
                                                          
41 id. 
42 Davies and Freedland op. cit., n. 38. 
43 P. Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Law Text and Materials (1984, 2nd edn) 2, 11. 
44 S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market (2004); R Mitchell, ‘Where Are We Going in 
Labour Law?’ (2011) 24 Australian J. of Labour Law 274-301. 
45 Deakin and Wilkinson op. cit., n. 44, ch. 5. 
46 See eg several of the contributions to C. Costello and M. Freedland (eds), Migrants at Work (2014); J. Howe, 
A. Chapman, I. Landau (eds), The Evolving Project of Labour Law (2017). 
47 Deakin and Wilkinson ‘Labour Markets and Legal Evolution’ in Deakin and Wilkinson op. cit., n. 44, esp. pp. 
26-36. 
48 R.M. Fischl, ‘Labor Law, the Left and the Lure of the Market’ (2011) 94 Marquette Law Rev. 947. 
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economics scholarship were used to assess particular laws as desirable or otherwise with 
reference to their potential to improve flexibility, efficiency and, perhaps, social inclusion. 
More sophisticated functional approaches of the kind associated with new institutional 
economics entailed the characterization of laws as ‘the equilibrium outcomes of a game’ – as 
the outcomes of a process of strategic interaction between rational economic actors – in a 
manner which ascribed no significance whatever to political and legislative processes, to 
judicial decision-making, or to interests and motivations other than rational economic ones.49 
As with any other framing of the subject matter, moreover, the ‘labour market regulation’ – 
or ‘law of the labour market’ – approach had the tendency to encourage particular lines of 
enquiry while shutting down others. Especially where the imperative of ‘market efficiency’ 
was approved, or partially approved, by the scholar in question, it was striking the extent to 
which non-economic considerations – dignity for workers, democracy at work – seemed to 
lose their force.50 Distributive justice, social solidarity, substantive equality, all were quickly 
eclipsed as quite secondary to the imperative of efficiency, unless, perhaps, they manifested 
in the form of an extreme ‘core labour rights’ or ‘human rights’ violation.51 Just as there was 
normative intent in the original characterization of labour law as social law, then, so the move 
to reframe the field as ‘market regulation’, or economic law, could have political implications 
of a quite different sort, whether these were intended by the scholars in question or not. 
 
The endeavour contained in this article to consider the contours and potential utility of an 
economic sociology of labour law proceeds from a recognition of the importance of labour 
markets as elements of the field of study. Wary of the normative implications of market-
framings, however, it proposes that analysis begin instead with the contract for work as the 
primary legal institution in the world of work and systems of labour law. In recognition of the 
fragmentation and commercialization of working relations in recent decades, it proposes 
further that the ‘contract for work’ be defined widely to include not only contracts of 
employment, but also contracts between ‘employing’ parties and workers who are not strictly 
speaking employees: zero-hours workers, casual workers, gig-economy workers etc. 
Contracting for work should be understood, moreover, to involve not only one-off offers and 
acceptances of terms, but, rather, processes which are on-going as the contractual framing of 
                                                          
49 Deakin and Wilkinson 8-9, citing M. Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (2001). 
50 Dukes op. cit., n. 33, pp. 110-11. 
51 Rittich op. cit., n. 15, p. 335. 
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the work-for-payment bargain changes over time.52 Crucially, contracting behaviour in the 
world of work ought to be conceived of as, at once, economic, social and legal: as likely 
economically motivated, but influenced too – and perhaps to a very significant degree – by 
actors’ perceptions of the applicable legal rules, social norms, and shared understandings of 
what is standard or fair or reasonable practice in the specific context. It follows that an 
approach is needed which allows analysts to take account of the economic, social and legal 
aspects of contracting behaviour, and to apprehend labour markets as social and legal as well 
as economic institutions. 
 
 
BEGINNING FROM WEBER 
 
In what follows, I review the economic sociology of Max Weber, together with his sociology 
of law, highlighting those elements that I find particularly suggestive when it comes to the 
study of labour law today. Included here are both ‘economic sociology’ in the quite specific 
sense in which Weber referred to it in Economy and Society – as a ‘subdiscipline’, together 
with economic theory and economic history, of the broader discipline of political economy 
(‘social economics’) – and ‘economic sociology’ in a looser sense, meaning in that case 
simply the application of sociological approaches or methods to the study of the economy and 
economic phenomena.53 I refer, then, not only to Economy and Society but to other of 
Weber’s writings, considering in turn the political economy of capitalism and the role of 
labour therein; the interaction of economic social action and the law; and the concept of the 
labour constitution as an aid to mapping the context within which contracting for work 
proceeds. In this and in the following part of the paper, my suggestion is that Weber’s work is 
especially useful when it comes to the analysis of contracting for work at the microlevel. His 
concept of the labour constitution, meanwhile, provides a means of allowing such analysis of 
individual contracting behaviour to inform, and to be informed by, studies of the relevant 
legal institutions, social structures, statuses and stratification, and of the political and 
economic power relations at play in shaping the development over time of law, social 
relations, and the economy. 
 
                                                          
52 Freedland op. cit., n. 8. 
53 Weber op. cit., n. 22, ch. 2; Swedberg (1998) op. cit., n. 1, pp. 4, 187, 189. 
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1. Capitalism and Labour 
 
On the political economy of capitalism, and the nature of labour relations in capitalist society, 
Weber closely followed Marx, according a centrality to wage labour that was reflective of the 
times in which they both lived.54 The primary concern was to understand the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism and, as symbolic of that transition, the emergence of the factory as 
the key site of production, housing workforces hired directly by owner-employers.55 In The 
Protestant Ethic, Weber focused his inquiry on the rationality or ‘work ethic’ characteristic of 
each mode of production. Why had workers abandoned the practice, typical of pre-capitalist 
times, of working until they had earned enough money to take care of their traditional needs, 
thereafter enjoying their leisure? Why had they adopted instead the ‘spirit of capitalism’, 
working as hard and for as long as was possible, so as to earn as much as was possible?56 For 
Weber, of course, a key explanatory factor here was ascetic Protestantism and its teaching 
that work was a calling, or vocation.57 For Marx, it was above all violence that had played the 
role of ‘midwife’ in the emergence of capitalism, wielded unsparingly to re-educate the 
medieval peasantry out of their traditional ‘subsistence mentality’, and into a capitalist ‘profit 
mentality’, thereby transforming them into the modern working-class.58 In either case, the 
authors were in agreement that, with the eventual establishment of (modern rational) 
capitalism, neither violence nor Protestant belief were anymore routinely necessary as a 
means of encouraging workers to labour as required.59 ‘The Puritan wanted to work in a 
calling’ wrote Weber, ‘we are forced to do so’; caught in the iron cage.60 For Marx: 
The dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to 
the capitalist… In the ordinary run of things, the labourer can be left to the ‘natural 
laws of production’ ie to his dependence on capital, a dependence springing from, and 
guaranteed in perpetuity by the conditions of production themselves.61 
 
                                                          
54 Streeck op. cit., n. 29. 
55 Tucker op. cit., n. 25; J. B. Freeman, Behemoth: A History of the Factory and the Making of the Modern 
World (2018), pp. 22-35.  
56 M. Weber, The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930), pp. 43, 41 
57 id. 
58 K. Marx, Capital vol 1 ([1867] 1976), ch. 31; Weber op. cit., n. 56, p. 17 
59 Streeck op. cit., n. 29, pp. 15-7 
60 Weber op. cit., n. 56, p. 129 
61 Marx op. cit., n. 58, ch. 28, p. 689 
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As is explicitly acknowledged here by Marx, the possibility that workers might again 
embrace a subsistence mentality in respect of their wage labour is something that never fully 
disappears in capitalist society.62 Indeed, it is in part because the spirit of capitalism has not 
always been sufficiently well internalised by workers – so as to turn them into rational profit-
maximisers – that labour markets have not always functioned as economic theory might 
predict.63 Wherever workers have chosen increased leisure time over higher income, for 
example, the supply of labour has declined, rather than risen, as its price increased. As a 
result of the social or even physical dependence of workers on a fixed minimum level of 
income, conversely, the supply of labour has increased, at times, rather than fallen, as wages 
declined.64 The need to minimize the ‘subsistentist threat’, as Streeck has put it, by ensuring 
the existence of a disciplined workforce, is one of the forces that has shaped and continues to 
shape regulation of working relations, from the Poor Law of the nineteenth century, to the 
welfare cuts of recent decades.65 One might also consider, in this context, the disciplining 
effects on workers of mortgages, consumer debt, the reduction and postponement of pension 
entitlements, and, in certain circumstances, of labour market policies aimed at increasing the 
supply of labour.66  
 
Of course, the insecure, or precarious, nature of some contracts for work (casual, zero-hours, 
self-employed) can serve itself to discipline workers, subduing any inclination they might 
otherwise have had to resist ill or unfair treatment. Over time, capitalism has proven to be 
compatible with a variety of modes of labour exploitation, or contracts for work, several of 
which may co-exist at any particular historical conjuncture.67 In seeking to analyse the novel 
relations of production prominent or emergent today, a key concern for scholars of labour law 
is to explore and assess the extent of domination and exploitation inherent in them.68 To that 
end, we should consider the manner in which laws effectively limit (or accentuate) workers’ 
market vulnerabilities, and facilitate (or obstruct) their ability to act collectively to protect 
                                                          
62 Streeck op. cit., n. 29. 
63 W. Streeck, ‘The Sociology of Labor Markets and Trade Unions’ in Smelser and Swedberg, op. cit., n. 1, p. 
262. 
64 Streeck op. cit., n. 77, p. 262; Weber op. cit., n. 56, p. 37. 
65 Streeck op. cit., n. 29, p. 34; N Whiteside, ‘Constructing Unemployment: Britain and France in Historical 
Perspective’ (2014) 48(1) Social Policy and Administration 67; S.J. Konzelmann, S. Deakin, M. Fovargue-
Davies and F. Wilkinson, Labour, Finance and Inequality (2018). 
66 G. Lebaron, ‘Reconceptualizing Debt Bondage: Debt as a Class-Based Form of Labor Discipline’, (2014) 
40(5) Critical Sociology 763. 
67 J. Banaji, Theory as History (2011) cited by Tucker op. cit., n. 25. 
68 Tucker op. cit., n. 25. 
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their interests. Insofar as space is available for collective action, questions then arise 
regarding the forms that this might take and the likelihood of its success. More generally, the 
broader political economy falls to be investigated as setting the conditions within which laws 
are enacted and enforced, collective action occurs, and capital exercises power.69 
 
 
2. Economic Social Action and the Law  
 
The specific economic sociology of Economy and Society is useful to us above all for its 
central concept of economic social action. Weber defined this as action that is driven mainly 
by material interests, and directed at utility, but also oriented to the behaviour of others.70 
Accordingly, economic sociology was the subfield of political economy that was directed at, 
‘the interpretive understanding of [economic] social action and thereby … a causal 
explanation of its own course and consequences’.71 The primary concern, in other words, was 
to understand the meaning that the individual attached to her own behaviour.72 (Was she 
driven by material or ideal interests, by habits or emotions? Was her action formally or 
substantively rational or irrational?) Using the notion of economic social action as a basic 
unit, or building block, Weber developed ever more complex definitions of particular 
institutions, for example, ‘the enterprise’, ‘the firm’, ‘property’ and ‘the market’.73 It 
followed that a central task for the researcher, in economic sociology as well as general 
sociology, was to establish the mechanisms through which a number of individual actions 
might turn into collective actions (institutions) of a new type.74  
 
When it came to the significance of law to economic social action, an important insight 
offered by Weber was the observation that, in the modern market economy, economic action 
was routinely oriented simultaneously to some other actor and, at the same time, to the legal 
order.75 (In other types of society, economic action might be oriented to the clan, the political 
order, the religious order.76) For example, where a party received money in the course of a 
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 Weber op. cit., n. 22, pp. 63-9. 
71 Id., pp. 63-9. 
72 Id., p. 4. 
73 Id., ch. 2. Weber didn’t himself use the term institution: Swedberg (1998) op. cit., n. 1, p. 169. 
74 Swedberg (1998) op. cit., n. 1, p.164. 
75 Weber op. cit., n. 22, p. 33.  
76 Swedberg (1998) op. cit., n. 1, p. 87. 
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transaction, she could assume that other actors would accept it in the course of future 
transactions. Where the legal order was taken into consideration by actors in this way, the 
principal consequence was that the economic action in question was more likely to take place 
as intended – promises would more often be kept; property better defended.77 Viewed from a 
sociological perspective, Weber suggested, the basic function of law in economic life could 
therefore be described as follows: 
The empirical validity of a norm as a legal norm affects the interests of an individual 
in many respects. In particular, it may convey to an individual certain calculable 
chances of having economic goods available or of acquiring them under certain 
conditions in the future.78 
 
In Weber’s analysis of the economy and law, contract enjoyed a special status as the principal 
means, among other things, by which the ‘power of control and disposal’ over economic 
resources was transferred and, as such, ‘the principal source of the relation of economic 
action to the law’.79 The contract was defined by Weber as ‘a voluntary agreement 
constituting the legal foundation of claims and obligations’.80 From a sociological point of 
view, what was remarkable about the contract was that it both allowed for the creation of new 
legal relationships through voluntary agreement, and increased the certainty that some social 
action would take place. In an advanced capitalist economy, law thus provided legal actors 
with a kind of space within which they were allowed to form new economic relationships by 
transferring economic power and control by means of contracts.81 
 
In a manner which might be understood to have particular relevance to consideration of the 
evolution of contracts for work, Weber distinguished between two main kinds of contract: the 
‘status contract’, which addressed a person’s total legal situation, and entailed a change from 
one status to another – to a master’s slave, for example, or servant – and the ‘purposive 
contract’, which aimed ‘solely … at some specific (especially) economic performance or 
result’.82 Purposive contracts had close links to the market and had become more common 
and more complex with market expansion. He also distinguished usefully between formal and 
                                                          
77 Weber op. cit., n. 22, 328. 
78 Id., p. 31. 
79 Id., p. 67. 
80 Id., p. 671.  
81 Id., pp. 668, 683.  
82 Id., pp. 672-673. See also O. Kahn-Freund, ‘A Note on Status and Contract in British Labour Law’ (1967) 30 
Modern Law Review 635. 
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substantive freedom to contract, highlighting here the notion quite fundamental to labour law 
that the freedom of a worker to enter into a contract with an employer is often illusory:  
[C]onditions of formal freedom are officially available to all; actually, however they 
are accessible only to the owners of property and thus in effect support their very 
autonomy and power positions… In the labour market, it is left to the ‘free’ discretion 
of the parties to accept the conditions imposed by those who are economically 
stronger by virtue of the legal guarantee of their property.83 
 
With respect to the relationship between particular types of legal system and economy at the 
macrolevel, Weber directed his attention to two principal questions: what role had the 
economy played in the general evolution of the law; and what could different legal systems 
teach us about the relationship between law and the economy?84 He was quite insistent that 
these were highly complex matters: there were no straightforward correlations, and causality 
didn’t work only in one direction.85 On the influence of the economy on legal change, he 
wrote that: 
‘Obviously, legal guaranties are directly at the service of economic interests to a very 
large extent. Even where this does not seem to be, or actually is not, the case, 
economic interests are among the strongest factors influencing the creation of law. 
For, any authority guaranteeing a legal order depends, in some way, upon the 
consensual action of the constitutive groups, and the formation of social groups 
depends, to a large extent, upon constellations of material interests.’86 
Just as he stopped short of characterizing law as exclusively the product of economic forces, 
so he also objected to the proposition that the economy was the product of legislation by the 
state. There were definite limits to how much the state could influence the economy through 
legal interventions.87  
 
 
3. The Labour Constitution 
 
                                                          
83 Weber op. cit., n. 22, pp. 730-1. 
84 Id,, p.89 
85 Id., p.88 
86 Weber op. cit., n. 22, 334 
87 Id., 334-5 
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Arbeitsverfassung, or ‘labour constitution’, was a term developed and employed by Weber in 
his early work on agriculture in the eastern territories of the German Empire: east of the river 
Elbe.88 As commonly used by political economists of the time, especially those of the 
historical school, the term ‘labour constitution’ meant the historically-given ensemble of 
conditions – social, economic, political, legal – governing the relations of workers to their 
employers and to other parties.89 As such, it had both social and juridical connotations and – 
similarly to the English word ‘constitution’ – an inherent ambiguity: it could denote either the 
‘regime’ governing or ordering labour relations, or the state of labour (in the abstract) itself.90 
While Weber employed the term in this generally accepted sense, he also used it to denote 
more specifically, the ‘relations of stratification within the larger socio-economic system’ – 
what we might otherwise refer to as the social relations of production.91 Emphasising, in 
those instances, the social nature of the labour constitution, Weber sought to make the point 
that economic variables could not in themselves account for the workers’ material situation. 
The labour constitution should be understood to be an independent variable, itself ‘decisive’ 
of the material situation of labour.92  
 
The second innovation in Weber’s development of the concept ‘labour constitution’ was 
precisely his proposal that it be understood, or utilized, as an ideal type: that is, as a logically 
coherent statement of the characteristic properties of a particular regime of labour relations, 
or ‘system of social stratification’.93 Seeking in his study of agriculture in the east to identify 
the ‘real’ consequences for labour of capitalist ‘rationalization’, he specified and compared 
two successive labour constitutions, the ‘patriarchal’ and the ‘capitalist’. The former was 
characterized by the personal domination of numerous strata of dependent labour by a master 
who was ‘not a simple employer, but rather a political autocrat’; by wage forms based on 
share-rights – use of plots of land, threshing shares, grazing rights – and, consequently, by a 
marked degree of shared interests between masters and servants.94 The latter emerged as a 
                                                          
88 See especially M. Weber, Verhältnisse der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland (1892); M. Weber 
‘Entwickelungstendenzen in der Lage der ostelbischen Landarbeiter’, (1894) 77 Preussische Jahrbücher 
reprinted in M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1924) 498. 
89 L. Scaff, ‘Weber before Weberian Sociology’ (1984) 35(2) British Journal of Sociology 190, p. 200; K. Tribe, 
‘translator’s note’ to a translation of Weber ‘Entwicklungstendenzen’ in K. Tribe (ed) Reading Weber (1989) 
185.  
90 Scaff, id., p. 200 
91 Id., p. 200. 
92 Weber, op. cit. (1894), n. 88, cited Scaff, id., 201. 
93 Scaff, id., p. 201, citing Weber, id. 
94 Weber, op. cit. (1894), n. 88 
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result of the ‘proletarianization’ of agrarian labour, and the polarization of what was now 
class conflict between the owners of the land and their workers. In juxtaposing these heuristic 
types, Weber did not intend to suggest an ontology or teleology of labour, but rather simply a 
sociology, or ‘developmental history’.95 The exploitation or ‘material situation’ of agrarian 
labour was presented as but one example of the old struggle for the ‘emancipation of labour 
from property’, first acted out in antiquity and repeating itself in new circumstances. 
Crucially, however, there was nothing natural or necessary in Weber’s view about the 
progression from one stage of the struggle to the next – from one form of labour constitution 
to the next.96 In response to the question which he himself posed in this body of work – how 
have societies organized labour-intensive agricultural production, especially in the face of 
inevitable seasonal fluctuations in labour requirements? – Weber composed not a teleology 
but a genealogy of labour, as Lawrence Scaff put it; in fact, a genealogy of labour 
constitutions.97 
 
In Scaff’s opinion, it is thus through Weber’s use of the concept ‘labour constitution’ that the 
distance between the Weberian approach and the Marxism of the day becomes most 
apparent.98 In emphasising the central importance of the labour constitution to the material 
condition of the workers, Weber rejected a simple economic determinism, perceiving instead 
a relation of ‘reciprocal causality’ between ‘technical economic conditions and interests’ on 
the one hand, and ‘social structure and political formation’ on the other.99 When he explained 
in the form of a genealogy the development of the labour constitution over time from one 
type, or stage, to another, he demonstrated his repudiation of the Hegelian notion of history, 
and his belief that Marx’s ‘developmental laws’ and concepts should be treated as contingent 
‘tendencies’ and ‘ideal types’, rather than as ‘necessary’ and ‘real’ entities.100 As developed 
by Weber, then, the notion of the labour constitution allowed for the application of a quite 
particular kind of structuralism: one which conceived of action as (only) partially a result of 
                                                          
95 Scaff, op. cit., n. 89, p. 202. 
96 Scaff, id., pp. 201-2, citing M. Weber, ‘Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum’, Handwörterbuch der 
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material/economic forces external to the individual, and which rejected the notion of a 
foundation-upward ‘inter-level’ causality model, in favour of a network or cyclical model.101 
 
 
TOWARDS AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF LABOUR LAW 
 
The challenge identified in the second part of this paper was to identify or elaborate an 
approach to the study of labour law which (i) began from the contract for work as the key 
legal institution in the field of working relations; (ii) defined this widely, to include contracts 
between workers and ‘employers’ that did not fall within the legal definition of contracts of 
employment, as well as those that did; and (iii) in light of the waning significance and reach 
of collective bargaining and statutory employment rights, aimed to analyse contracting for 
work as a form of private ordering that is likely economically motivated but influenced, at the 
same time, by the applicable laws and other elements of the social and economic context 
within which it proceeds. On the basis of the foregoing discussion of Weber’s economic 
sociology and sociology of law, the contours of such an approach begin to suggest 
themselves, constructed around the notions of the contract for work and the labour 
constitution.  
 
 
1. Contracting for Work and the Labour Constitution 
  
In a Weber-inspired economic sociology of labour law, analysis should begin with the 
contract for work and proceed on the assumption that contracting behaviour is economic 
social action that is oriented to the legal order; driven, in other words, mainly by material 
interests, and directed at utility, but also oriented to the behaviour of others, and to the law. 
Contracting for work should be conceived of as a means by which parties can create and give 
form to new working relationships through voluntary agreement, bearing in mind always that 
the worker’s freedom of contract is typically only formal, and not substantive, by reason of 
the greater economic power of the employing organisation. Indeed, as systems of collective 
industrial relations are dismantled or marginalised, it is typically the case that the choice of 
                                                          
101 Id., pp. 202, 203. Weber spoke later of ‘causal chains’, deriding the ‘theorists of the super-structure’ for their 
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form of work contract, and the drafting of specific terms, is in the power of the employing 
organisation alone. In the hands of professionalised human resource managers, contracting 
for work is managed in direct response to labour legislation and to the various forms of 
control, constraint, and risk which the applicable legal rules are understood to constitute. As a 
result, one very significant general trend is away from the routine use of contracts of 
employment (potentially ‘status contracts’, in Weber’s terminology) in favour of more casual 
or commercial contractual forms (‘purposive contracts’). In many cases, employment 
contracts are retained for a ‘core’ of workers, while the majority are rendered ‘peripheral’ – 
casual and dispensable – through the use of contracts of a more purposive nature.102 
 
Notwithstanding our initial labelling of contracting for work as a form of ‘private ordering’, 
recognition of actors’ orientation to the legal order should alert us to the all-important role 
here of the state, and of society;103 of the fallacy or even mendacity involved in 
distinguishing categorically between a putatively private (economic) sphere and putatively 
public (political) sphere.104 Even in an era of largely ‘deregulated’ labour markets, law and 
social norms influence contracting behaviour in a wide variety of ways, both direct and 
indirect: conferring, and placing limits on, contractual freedoms; defining remedies in case of 
breach; shaping actors’ understandings of what is ‘normal’ or ‘fair’ in a given situation; 
encouraging the design of avoidance strategies to take an agreement outside of the scope of 
application of particular rules.105 More fundamentally, law constructs or reinforces power 
relations within the economy by assigning rights to property – ‘powers of control and 
disposal’ – to some and not to others.106 Trade unions may fulfil important functions in 
respect of contracting for work, both strengthening the hand of workers when contracts for 
work are first negotiated, and acting, thereafter, as ‘guardians of the contract’ to ensure that 
its terms are respected.107 
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That laws, social norms and statuses, and collective institutions function in these ways to 
limit or augment the freedom of action of the parties to a contract for work is well captured 
by Weber’s notion of the labour constitution. ‘In the sociological sense’, Weber wrote, the 
constitution is ‘the modus of distribution of power which determines the possibility of 
regulating social action’.108 With reference to this definition, and building upon our 
characterisation of the contract for work as a form of ordering – therefore, of ‘regulating 
social action’ – the labour constitution might be understood as the complex of rules, 
institutions, social norms, and social statuses etc which together determine the possibility of 
contracting for work.  
 
It is with this definition in mind, that I propose the labour constitution as a tool to map the 
various contexts – or regulated spaces – within which contracting for work proceeds: a 
particular workplace, company, sector, locality and jurisdiction.109 For each such space, ideal 
typical labour constitutions might be constructed and then refined with regard to the 
prevailing laws, institutions, social norms, shared understandings etc in the space in question. 
Used in this way, the labour constitution would provide a means of moving beyond the 
microlevel of analysis to the meso- and macrolevels, without defaulting automatically to ‘the 
labour market’ as that which frames the field. It would allow for comparisons to be drawn 
between different workplaces, sectors, jurisdictions, and across time, in a way that might then 
aid the construction of hypotheses, or drawing of conclusions, regarding the influence of 
particular laws and institutions on contracting behaviour. And it would allow us to address 
questions regarding the interaction of different ‘labour constitutions’ with one another, and 
the implications of the uneven development of such constitutions in different countries, 
regions, or places of work: questions of inequalities and conflicts of interest between workers, 
of the manipulation of such inequalities by transnational corporations and other investors, and 
of threats of competitive deregulation. 
 
When it comes to the analysis of legal change, Weber’s remarks regarding economic power 
and political influence are highly instructive: ‘economic interests are among the strongest 
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factors influencing the creation of law’.110 With respect to public policy and legislation, they 
suggest an approach such as that developed by Georg Menz, taking inspiration from 
Pashukanis, which understands the state and public policy to be shaped to a significant degree 
by the interests of the ‘predominant and hegemonic’ social classes, and, as such, begs the 
question of the role of business – and, potentially, of collectivised labour – in ‘driving 
forward’ particular policy changes.111 Adjudication might usefully be conceived, with Weber 
and Duncan Kennedy, as a form of ‘legal social action’, since the judge will always orientate 
her reasoning to the law but simultaneously also to others (the community of judges, the 
wider community).112 Of course, businesses and trade unions play important roles here, too, 
bringing cases to court and providing financial and other forms of support to litigants. 
 
In addition to legislation and adjudication, questions abound regarding the internalization and 
mobilization of legal rules by lay actors.113 Weber wrote of the reconstruction of juridical 
rules by ordinary people as ‘maxims of action’.114 It follows that law should be understood 
not as a simple external constraint on social action but as internal to situated behaviour and 
social interactions.115 We should ask ourselves, as Kahn-Freund put it: ‘how do [legal] norms 
change as a result of their contact with reality, … how is the abstract content of the norm 
made concrete, how does it adapt itself to social reality, how does this reality influence the 
conceptual grouping of existing norms, and how does the spontaneous social creation of 
norms influence the corpus of existing norms?’116 In charting legal change over time, the 
method to be adopted, following Weber, is genealogy. A genealogy of labour constitutions 
would allow for legal rules and concepts to be understood as they have interacted with one 
another and with prevailing social norms and economic power relations in particular places, 
at particular points in time.117  
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An example of what is envisaged here can be found in recent work by Eric Tucker on the 
Uber model of taxi service provision.118 Seeking to place Uber in historical perspective, and 
to do so in a way which takes full account of the specifically capitalist nature of the gig 
economy in general, and of Uber in particular, Tucker develops a stylized history of what he 
calls the different ‘taxi capitalisms’ of twentieth century Toronto. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, he narrates, the sector was as yet largely unregulated but entry costs were 
high; taxi provision came to be dominated by large fleet owners who employed drivers 
directly. When the price of motor cars fell, competition increased, various types of 
middlemen appeared, and drivers’ incomes fell dramatically. Over the course of the following 
decades, successive waves of regulation were shaped by the changing interests and power 
relations of the various actors: drivers, fleet owners, customers, middlemen. While Uber was 
functionally equivalent to the middlemen of earlier years, it succeeded – at least in the short 
term – in characterising itself as something other – a ‘rideshare’ company – so as to avoid the 
obligations imposed by existing regulations and laws. 
 
In sketching these successive ‘taxi capitalisms’ – or labour constitutions – Tucker’s intention 
is to develop a heuristic that will allow him to identify the consequences for workers of 
changes to the regulation of the taxi sector, and to the business models adopted by enterprises 
in that sector, including the preferred form of (contractual) relationship with drivers.119 
Particular attention is paid to the questions of how value was abstracted, or profits made, at 
specific points in time, and how business models and working relations (‘social relations of 
production’) were adapted in the light of new technologies, new rules, and changing levels of 
competition. A second point of focus lies with the changing opportunities for those creating 
value – the drivers – to collectivise and to fight for the right to a greater share of the farebox 
income. The similarities between this exercise and what I have in mind when I propose a 
genealogy of labour constitutions are striking. It would remain, however, to supplement the 
sketch of labour constitutions with analysis of the meaning which the contractual relations 
have for individual drivers and brokers, or drivers and medallion owners. (Does the driver 
                                                          
118 Tucker op. cit., n. 25. For further examples of approaches to the study of labour law that, without necessarily 
using the precise language of ESL, share elements of what I propose here, see N. Zatz, ‘Prison Labor and the 
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understand himself to be contracting for work? Does he understand himself therefore to be 
owed a minimum wage and other employment rights? Alternatively, does he regard himself 
as truly self-employed? Which aspects of his working relationship does he object to and why? 
What account of prevailing legal rules has been taken by the drafter of the contract for work 
and to what end? Etc.) The question would then arise whether these understandings had led to 
the emergence of particular practices or even social norms; whether they had resulted in 
collective action, or in collective lobbying or strategic litigation in an effort to effect legal 
change. In order to test hypotheses regarding the effects of specific rules or laws on 
contracting behaviour, comparison might be made with labour constitutions and contracting 
for work in other municipalities or jurisdictions. 
 
 
2. From the Critical Sociology of Labour Law to the Economic Sociology of Labour Law 
 
As sketched out above, a Weber-inspired ESL is similar in significant respects to the critical 
socio-legal tradition in labour law. Both are concerned to analyse law empirically; to consider 
‘the social effect of the norm ... the way in which it appears in society and ... its social 
function’.120 Both understand the economy and society to be constantly evolving, in different 
ways in different locations, so that particular economic and social configurations are regarded 
as context specific rather than inevitable or universal.121 Both ascribe particular importance to 
the existence of power relations within the economy, recognising that the worker is typically 
compelled to sell her labour.122 Both reject, at least partially, the public/private distinction as 
it applies to labour law, and both are somewhat sceptical of the capacity of law to affect 
changes in social and economic behaviour.123  
 
The most obvious difference between the two approaches arises in connection with the focus 
and scope of the ensuing analysis. At the time of the development of the critical socio-legal 
tradition in labour law, the rules which regulated working relationships were mostly agreed 
by trade unions and employers’ associations in the form of collective agreements.124 Within 
                                                          
120 Kahn-Freund op. cit., n. 32, p. 98. 
121 See eg O. Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37(1) Modern Law Review 1.   
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systems of collectivized industrial relations, the contract of employment retained its 
technical-legal significance as that upon which all else hinged – including importantly the 
applicability to the parties in question of collectively agreed terms and conditions – but, in 
substance, it was little more than an empty shell; a ‘bare’ agreement to work in exchange for 
wages.125 It followed that scholars focused their analysis primarily on those laws which 
facilitated and encouraged the emergence and ‘smooth functioning’ of systems of collective 
bargaining and collective dispute resolution, characterising these as forms of autonomous 
rule-making and rule-enforcement.126 By critical scholars such as Sinzheimer, the very aim of 
labour law was argued to lie with the decommercialization – the de-marketization – of 
employment relations. The aspiration, wrote Kahn-Freund, was:  
to show the way from the law of contract to the law of labour, from the treatment of 
the worker as a ‘person’, abstractly equal to the employer, to his treatment as a human 
being, concretely dependent in his existence.127 
For analytical and normative purposes, it was possible to concentrate on the regulatory 
function of collective bargaining, and to treat the individual contractual and market aspects 
(Preiskampf, Konkurrenzkampf128) of the employment relation as having been largely 
suppressed: labour law was social law. The concern of the critical scholars lay primarily with 
collective structures and collective (class) interests, rather than with those of the individual. 
 
In the economic sociology of labour law proposed here, in contrast, the focus shifts to the 
contract for work as the (emergent) primary source of legal norms in the field of working 
relations and, in the first instance, onto the motivations and actions of the individual as party 
to the contract. At the same time, the focus widens to include not only ‘labour law’, narrowly 
conceived, and collective labour institutions, but also other fields of law, or elements of them, 
which together ‘determine the possibility of contracting for work’ as it was put above: 
immigration law, social security law, family law, private law, corporate governance, financial 
regulation. In view of the liberalization of labour markets and recommodification of labour in 
recent decades, labour law (and these other laws) are no longer defined a priori as social law. 
Instead, the formally rational (‘market justice’) and substantively rational (‘social justice’) 
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elements of contracting behaviour and the context(s) within which it proceeds are treated as 
factors to be determined.129  
 
In Sinzheimer’s work, the labour constitution figured as the body of law – constitutional and 
statutory – which fulfilled the function of ‘constitutionalizing’, or democratizing, the 
economy.130 In a manner referred to above, Sinzheimer’s analysis of the relevant legislation 
was both descriptive of the law in force and normative, arguing for a particular interpretation 
of that law. The scope of the labour constitution was dictated by the identification of the 
democratizing function. It consisted, accordingly, of those laws which accorded rights to 
collectivized labour to participate on a parity basis with capital in the regulation of working 
relationships, workplaces, companies, and – in aspiration, at least – the economy as a whole.  
 
My definition of the labour constitution as ‘the complex of rules, institutions, social norms, 
and social statuses etc which together determine the possibility of contracting for work’ is 
less obviously determinative, and potentially much broader, than Sinzheimer’s. In part, this 
has to do with my intention to construct ideal typical labour constitutions and to use these, in 
the first instance, as Weber proposed, for heuristic and expository purposes. According to 
Weber, the ideal type was intended to ‘aid description’ and not, itself, to be either descriptive 
or evaluative of concrete phenomena: the adjective ‘ideal’, here, was categorically not an 
expression of approbation.131 That is not to say, on the other hand, that in Weber’s hands the 
labour constitution was entirely ‘value free’: selection of the particular characteristics or 
factors to be accentuated in an ideal type was a preliminary and inevitable step, in Weber’s 
opinion,132 and should proceed precisely with reference to ‘value-ideas’.133 The sole criterion 
by which the choice of factors should then be judged was the capacity of the resultant ideal 
type to ‘reveal concrete cultural phenomena in their interdependence, their causal conditions 
and their significance’.134  
 
Like Weber’s ‘patriarchal’ and ‘capitalist’ agricultural labour constitutions east of the river 
Elbe, the taxi labour constitutions sketched by Tucker well illustrate how reference to ‘value-
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ideas’ might result in constructs which, though primarily heuristic and expository in nature, 
suggest hypotheses or conclusions that are capable of informing normative argument. 
Tucker’s value-ideas, as we have seen, are worker domination and exploitation, and his 
labour constitutions allow him to address two sets of questions regarding the role of the 
applicable law in limiting (accentuating) workers’ market vulnerabilities, and in facilitating 
(obstructing) their ability their efforts at collectivisation and resistance. Depending on the 
nature of the research questions in any given study, alternative or additional value 
orientations could, of course, be selected: for example, in the case of the taxi sector, 
consumer rights, or the wider public interest.135 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Writing in 1986 in defence of the socio-legal tradition in labour law, Lord Wedderburn 
formulated the aim of scholarship in the field as follows. 
‘Projects for new labour laws must be tested in concrete terms by their effect upon 
real people, the condition and quality of their lives, their prosperity and their – real, 
not theoretical – liberty’.136 
The role of the scholar, in Wedderburn’s opinion – and in Sinzheimer’s and Kahn-Freund’s 
before him – was to assess the consequences for workers, and for the wider public interest, of 
particular laws and social arrangements, with a view to influencing the formation of policy, 
legislation, and legal precedent. Even today, it seems to me that this is broadly reflective of 
how scholars of labour law understand the task at hand. In different places at different times, 
legislatures and courts might show themselves more or less willing to pay heed to arguments 
or evidence that speaks to those consequences. But in any case the arguments ought still to be 
made and the evidence gathered – because one day they might be heard again; because 
legislatures and judges are anyway not the only audience for such work. 
 
In view of the interpenetration of the social and the economic that we might understand to be 
characteristic of neoliberalism, there is growing recognition among scholars that social 
scientific analysis should not proceed any longer from an assumption that these are separate 
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spheres with distinct logics of action. In respect of the study of labour law, trends towards the 
greater commercialization and ‘precarization’ of working relationships imply the need for an 
approach that will allow for adequate account to be taken of the individual and market, as 
well as the social and legal, aspects of those relationships. Drawing on elements of Weber’s 
political economy, economic sociology and sociology of law, I sought to make the case in 
this article for the usefulness of what I have called the economic sociology of labour law. 
Having identified the contract for work as the key legal institution in the field, and the 
primary focus of scholarly analysis, I went on to characterise the act of contracting for work 
as an example of what Weber called economic social action that is oriented to the legal order. 
With Weber, I gave particular emphasis to the importance of interpreting the meaning which 
that action has for the actors themselves. I further proposed that Weber’s notion of the labour 
constitution be used to map the context within which contracting for work takes place. 
Defining the labour constitution as ‘the complex of rules, institutions, social norms, and 
social statuses etc which together determine the possibility of contracting for work’, I 
suggested that it be understood to provide a means of allowing microanalysis of contracting 
behaviour to inform, and to be informed by, studies of the relevant legal institutions, social 
structures and social statuses, and of the political and economic power relations at play in 
shaping the development over time of the law, social relations, and the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
